“Not Because They Are Easy; But Because They Are Hard”

It’s hard not to get goosebumps when reading President Kennedy’s speech on America’s exploration of space. In reading his speech is it is easy to see why Kennedy was such a great communicator. It is also easy to see why Americans were convinced that winning a space race with the Soviet Union was necessary. Yet, in order to be consistent with my criticisms of the Soviet Union in previous blogs, it must be asked whether America was any less inclined to fall into the fantasy world regarding science than was the Soviet Union.

From these readings, and from learning about Kennedy from other classes, it seems quite clear that Kennedy wanted his administration to be something much different from Eisenhower’s. “The Best and the Brightest” wanted a different America, yet it seems that they weren’t exactly sure what they wanted this America to look like, and despite their confidence, it seems that they had even less idea about how to actually change America. President Kennedy, Vice President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and many others pushed for the development of the space program without an understanding of what they actually wanted to accomplish. If one was to cynically look at Kennedy’s statement that space travel is necessary “because it is there”, it could be said that this was the extent of Kennedy’s space policy. Lots of smart people spent a great deal of time and a whole lot of money to achieve anything that looked like success in space, mostly for show. The United States was engaged in a war with the Soviet Union, perhaps also simply “because it was there”, and the perception of winning the Cold War was more important than reality. I’m not making the argument that America shouldn’t pursue space exploration, but the way it was done in the Kennedy administration was reckless. Instead of creating policies that made sense financially and scientifically, the American government was obsessed with creating any type of accomplishment that could outshine the Soviet’s success. Kennedy’s speech and administration make the argument that space travel can bring people of the world together, but Kennedy appears to have used space travel to rip humanity farther apart.

The Kennedy administration was not only less than forthright about the space race, but it was also elusive on questions regarding the Cold War and Weapons of Mass Destruction. In the 1960 presidential campaign Kennedy claimed that the Eisenhower administration had allowed a missile gap to take form with the Soviet Union. These statements were not really true, as there were varying reports, as seen in the readings, of the actual Soviet missile count, and the United States certainly had a more advanced nuclear arsenal, regardless of the number of weapons the Soviet Union had. Yet, upon taking office, Kennedy and McNamara pushed and pushed for missiles until it became blatantly clear that the United States had put itself in a completely dominant situation. Once again there was an enormous enthusiasm for what was scientifically and militarily possible, without regard for the consequences. Previously, I discussed McNamara and his emphasis on the ‘fog of war’. These readings clarify his statements, as McNamara himself valued efficiency in changing the Pentagon as oppose to perspective in examining what the Pentagon was actually trying to accomplish.

The arms race eventually evolved into the theory of mutually assured destruction. The idea that if both the Soviet Union and the United States both had second strike capability, that neither side would find it rational to use nuclear weapons. Once could point to this theory and say that it has been successful because there has been no use of nuclear weapons since the end of World War Two. But it seems that making this argument is like saying that “everyday the Rooster crows and then the sun comes up. Therefore the rooster made the sun come up” There may have been an infinite amount of unknown factors as to why nuclear weapons were never used and why the Cold War ended peacefully. As seen during the Cuban Missile crisis, nuclear war was always possible, and a nuclear conflict only needs to happen once to bring unprecedented suffering to humanity. Additionally, the nuclear build up pursued by Kennedy has left the world with many more nuclear weapons that could be used by terrorists or rogue nations. Mutually assured destruction is a weak attempt at explaining why nuclear war hasn’t happened, and it is no a way an accurate prediction of why nuclear won’t happen in the future.

President Kennedy had a bold vision for America in space, but he had a far less bold vision for America in the Cold War. He chose the easy path of matching the Soviet’s propaganda about science, space, and weapons build up, instead of stepping back and doing what was hard; leveling with the America people about what was really in average American interests, and what was actually the best path towards peace. President Bush had a similarly bold vision in Iraq, and he has had great troubles not because he is insincere or corrupt, but because he chose to do what was easy and use violence instead of doing what was hard and reexamining American foreign policy. America has a military twenty times the size of any other nation, and it is difficult to argue that this actually benefits America. Tens of thousands of Americans died in Korea and Vietnam in the Cold War, and 3,000 more have died so far in the war on terror. In 2007, as it was in 1961, it easy to continue to use America’s economic and military dominance to settle disputes through violence, while it is hard to reexamine America’s foreign policy and truly strive towards peace.

The Soviet Union’s Religious Experience

At several points during the course Professor Maleki has made the argument that aspects of science are not that different from religion. While I respect his objectivity in discussing his profession, I have always been a proponent of science being superior to religion. In some ways I saw science as the eventual answer to all problems, with religion’s irrationality standing in its way. While this still might be true, through the reading on the glorification of physics in the Soviet Union, I can see how the belief in science can become so great, that it basically becomes religious.

In the years after World War Two Stalin valued the development of nuclear physics with the belief that another world war with the west was inevitable. When Khrushchev came to power he changed the definition of how nuclear physics would influence the Soviet Union and he may have even increased its prominence. As the new Soviet leader backed away from many of the extreme aspects of Stalin’s regime he pushed for coexistence with the west. This meant that physics would be used to benefit the Soviet Union domestically more than ever before.

In typical Soviet fashion the nation mobilized to make every aspect of Soviet industry and life better by the smashing of the atom. Marxism and its unlimited faith in science helped this scientific momentum take over various sectors of the economy and give physicists unprecedented political power. With the Soviet government’s lack of public exposure, its scientists became increasingly less accountable. The enthusiasm over what might come from physics allowed scientists to spend money on projects that were often far fetched and unsafe. Additionally, the communist party increased its propaganda exclaiming science as superior to religion. The Soviet people treated physicists like rock stars and sent in fan mail proposing ideas that they truly needed faith to believe in. Marx once called religion “the opium of the masses” and it is hard to argue that science wasn’t serving the same purpose in the Soviet Union during this period.

One of the things that truly amazed me was Trofim Denisovich Lysenko and his rejection of genetics. Perhaps it is unfair to judge him and supporters from a modern day viewpoint, but Lysenko’s claims seem to be ridiculous. The Soviet Union’s leadership seems to have supported Lysenko partly because of their religious fervor towards science. They believed science could achieve anything, and if a scientist said wheat could be improved without genetics, then it was possible. Further, there was certainly opposition regarding Lysenko’s claims from the scientific community, but Khrushchev and other politicians generally chose the more fantastic scientific ideas. While there were surely honest scientists in the Soviet Union it appears that the ones mostly willing to exaggerate the abilities of science got the most funding and political power. As the reading states, the leadership of scientists and politicians during this period valued economics and politics over morality. Science can achieve great things, but it is not a good or evil in and of itself. Unfortunately the lack of responsible behavior by many in the Soviet Union involving science, occasionally did more harm than good. I’ll still take science over religion, but I’m coming to the realization that both are fallible and that while government has a role in science, there must be boundaries between the two.

The Chain Reaction of Preemption

posted at 10:15 a.m.

The push for the atomic bomb in the Soviet Union seems to have had an even greater sense of urgency than the effort in America. While America spent a great deal of time and effort building the bomb as a possible way of ending World War Two, the brutal battle on the eastern front between Russia and German made the Soviet Union’s pursuit of the bomb almost impossible. While patriotism and the defeat of fascism was on scientists minds at Los Alamos they did not experience the suffering and fighting in their homes like Soviet scientists did. Further, from earlier readings we know that Truman may have used the bomb on Japan to send a message to the Soviet Union. Therefore Stalin’s pursuit of the bomb seemed to be an act of survival. While there was talk in the reading of the Soviet Union wanting to remain one the three superpowers (the United States and Britain included) the urgency of building the bomb of World War Two was greatly due to the Soviets belief that they were headed for another unbearable war.

In the years preceding World War Two the imagery of the atom being smashed fit in well with Soviet propaganda, and while the development of nuclear weapons was still part of their propaganda, developing the atom bomb and then the hydrogen bomb after the war was about deterring the United States. Instead of trying a unique root to the bomb that might have proved more cost effective and spread the Soviet Union’s scientific reputation, which was suggested by some leading Soviet scientists, Soviet politicians understood the urgency of building a bomb and took no risks, and used a process mimicking the Manhattan project that was very costly. In the years after World War Two the Soviet Union was completely devastated and had many structural issues. Therefore the fact that Soviet Union chose the most expensive approach shows their fears about American nuclear dominance. If Truman was willing to drop two atom bombs on Japan just to send a message to the Soviet Union, then it must have seemed that the United States was capable of anything.

I once again found the relationship between scientists and politicians fascinating. In deciding to build the atomic bomb in the style of the Manhattan project rather than an alternative method, it is described the ‘time and security had to be valued over scientists egos’. While it clear that scientists and politicians butted heads in this process, with one scientists complaining that leaders of the projects had to have scientific vision, scientists were deeply committed to the cause. Many of them believed in building of the bomb as a patriotic duty, and like American scientists it does not appear that they seriously questioned the morality of their venture until years later (1955). Further in order to build the bomb after the war scientists sacrificed safety for time restraints and engaged in risky experiments without proper testing that could have lead to radiation damage, in order to work as quickly as possible. From our readings much earlier in the class, and these readings, we know that it was not always a smooth relationship between the communist party and scientists, but it appears that all of Russia had been so devastated by Germany in World War Two that many scientist were willing to do a great deal to protect their homeland.

Finally, the descriptions of the Physics being used to build the bomb in this reading mentioned the importance of chain reactions. It appears that Truman’s pre-emptive strike against the Soviet Union, through his bombing of Japan, set off a chain of events that guaranteed a cold war and massive nuclear build up. While it is certainly possible that America and the Soviet Union were headed for some type of conflict anyway, Truman’s preemptive steps towards war guaranteed a conflict and destroyed any chance for reconciliation. While preemptive war may prevent some other type of conflict, it guarantees that there will be conflict and suffering. This is a lesson that our government has earned well over the last four and a half years.

Disproportional Response

While learning about the creation of the Hydrogen bomb and the prosecution of Robert Oppenheimer it is easy to come to the conclusion that both situations were centered on Disproportional Responses. I found the debate over development of the Hydrogen bomb to be fascinating. It was interesting to see how scientists who had previously worked to create the atom bomb found the hydrogen bomb immoral. To some extent I agree with the army general who argued that all weapons in war were essentially immoral and that it was useless to debate the morality of every new weapon. In arguments against creating the Hydrogen bomb scientists advocated using tactical atom bombs instead of the enormously powerful Hydrogen bomb. If America had the means to destroy an enemy with many bombs as opposed to one hydrogen bomb would this really be any more moral? In the article it is even argued that a transition from conventional warfare to tactical atom bombs would be far more conceivable than anyone actually using the Hydrogen bomb. It is easy to see why the Hydrogen bomb is worrisome but it seems that the arguments against it were a way for a group of scientists to try to undo the damage they had done at Hiroshima. By the time the Hydrogen bomb was being discussed the world had already entered a nuclear age and there was little that could be done about it.

In a far worse example of a disproportional response were the actions of the United States government in prosecuting Robert Oppenheimer. Few things make me as upset when studying American history than Joseph McCarthy and the men who participated in the House Un-American activities. It still shocks me that this type of behavior was sanctioned by the United States government not so long ago. Oppenheimer may have had a political outlook far to the left of what many Americans in the cold war tolerated, but he had served the United States in a variety of roles and had even played a crucial part in building the atom bomb. Simply because Oppenheimer finally took a stand against the development of nuclear weaponry with the Hydrogen bomb doesn't mean he was a traitor. The author of this chapter explains Oppenheimer's idiot responses in a portion of his testimony to be a way for Oppenheimer to show authorities that he was showing he was willing to cooperate. While this is probably true I took his response as Oppenheimer's way of showing his complete disillusionment with the process. What rational defense can be made when the prosecution's case is so ridiculous and so unethical? Through the fear created by the Cold War many of America's leaders betrayed the principles they said they were fighting for in WW 2. Scientists overreached in their arguments against the Hydrogen bomb and the American government greatly overreached in responses to these scientists opinions. Both were Disproportional Responses.

The Fog of War

A couple of years I watched a documentary featuring Robert McNamara called the Fog of War. McNamara had many roles in his life but the documentary focused on his time in the Air Force during World War Two and his time as Secretary of Defense, which took place during some of the most intense years of the Vietnam War. In discussing his role in relentlessly bombing Japanese cities at the end of the war and the fact that if the allies had lost they would have been tried for war crime and after hearing him somberly describe the failures in Vietnam he said something that seemed very meaningful. He stated that the human race needed to evaluate the amount of evil in the world and what amount of violence was worth it to destroy it. McNamara went on to say that when humans engage in something so intense and emotional as war that a fog is created that distorts right and wrong and the values and ideas being fought for in the first place. This fog seems to have plagued Truman the scientists working on the Atomic bomb at the close of World War Two and the beginning of the Cold War.

It is very difficult for me to imagine the psyche of the American people and someone like Truman at the close of the Second World War. All of American society had been shaken by the war and thousands of Americans had perished. The hatred that must have filled the hearts of even the best of Americans for Germany and Japan must have been immense. I think it is possible that this is partly why the Truman administration chose to ignore the evidence that historians now see clearly that saw a peaceful way for Japan to surrender. Considering the brutality of the conflict between Japan and America perhaps Truman saw facts in front of him that went against his emotional reaction that the war could never end peacefully. Perhaps more important, and also related to the fog of war is the fact that Truman saw dropping the bomb on Japan to gain the upper hand in what seemed to be an inevitable conflict with the Soviet Union. It wasn't irrational for Truman to see a future conflict between the two great victors of World War Two but looking back now it appears horrifying that dropping the atom bomb on Japan would be used to begin this struggle. I can only attribute this to the fog of war. Because of the great losses of World War Two perhaps Truman saw the world as a place with so much evil that war might go on and on forever. Truman was desperate enough to end World War Two and more importantly prevent another great war with the Soviet Union that he was willing to kill thousands of more Japanese when it was almost certainly unnecessary. It is impossible not feel sympathy for a shell-shocked America in 1945, but it does not excuse the horrific decision to begin a nuclear era simply to send a message.

The fog of war did not escape scientists during World War Two. Whether it was for personal gain, to defeat fascism, or for their patriotism many scientists allowed the fog to distort a view of the future where they could not control the influence of their work. In New Mexico where the scientists relentlessly attempted to build the bomb, it mentioned frequently that there was little discussion of what the implications were of what they were doing. And when questions were asked influential scientists were often pushed to the side and were told to quietly push towards their goal. When World War Two came to a close and the fog began to clear many scientists tried to gain influence in how their technology was being used, but the monster they had created was difficult to control. The America they lived in was hypersensitive to criticism of the military industrial complex built upon science and technology, and was engaged in a Cold War where the threat of nuclear war hung over science and humanity. America and science achieved many great things during World War Two but in what were very difficult circumstances they both could of done a better job of respecting human life and looking at the broader impact of their actions and choices.

Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle: Not Just a Theory for Physics-

Posted at 10:09 am

I found the events at Farm Hall to be fascinating as this temporary prison served as a type of purgatory for the German scientists who had worked on the atomic bomb. In the discussions that took place an important theme was the question of exactly how greatly did they support Nazi Germany and how much harm did their support do. To a certain extent they were all guilty of not speaking out against Hitler, they all contributed in some way to National Socialism. Perhaps only one of these physicists was actually a Nazi, but they were all supposedly trying to build a bomb and they had not taken on the burden of being sent to a concentration camp by criticizing Hitler as other courageous men and women had done. Farm Hall was not a purgatory for heaven or hell, because none on these men were evil, but it was a purgatory for their conscience as these men had to ponder of they could have done more.

As Professor Walker makes clear, the fundamental questions regarding the scientists cannot be answered with complete precision. Yet, it seems to me that these scientists were at the very least trying to build a nuclear reactor, if not the bomb. It is fascinating that these scientists believed they would be remembered for building a peaceful reactor while the allies built a lethal bomb. I am skeptical of this viewpoint that suggests that German scientists would have not given Hitler the bomb if they had it. In the confusion at Farm Hall regarding the allies’ success regarding the atom bomb it proposed that perhaps they had simply dropped a nuclear reactor on Hiroshima. Therefore it appears that they knew a nuclear reactor was not just a step towards a bomb but a weapon in and of itself. Further it seems unlikely that these scientists would or could have kept the bomb from Hitler even if they were uneasy about the ramifications on unclear weapons. It seems probable that Hitler would have found out about the bomb and coerced it out of these physicists. Either these scientists would have been overtaken by their patriotism and love for German science as a way to save Germany at the end of the war or Hitler would have brutally tortured them until he learned of it. Ultimately these men did not seem all that interested in standing up against Nazi Germany and it not certain they would have started when regarding the Atom bomb.

Heisenberg’s role at Farm Hall is also fascinating. It is a great irony that he stated that a United States of Europe would be far more favorable to a Germany under a Russian Empire, only a few years after he made the argument that science would be better under Germany than Russia. Heisenberg is ever the pragmatist and he seems to have a principle of an uncertain morality. In earlier reading when I first read Heisenberg’s theory of “Active and Passive Resistance” I sympathized with him. Like many Germans he was put in impossible situations and at least he did not fully comply with Hitler. Yet, in the period when German scientists knew the allies had done something with the atomic bomb but were not exactly sure what, he fantasizes about what the Germans might have done better so that not only the reputation of German science will be saved but because their could be great money in it. Instead of actively taking a stand on much of anything Heisenberg is constantly calculating whose rule would be better, how his reputation will be changed, and even at times what his bank account will look like. While the time at Farm Hall provided ample opportunity to discuss guilt and remorse and fear, like once Scientist did in praying that the Soviets would not capture his family, Heisenberg uses the time to justify his failures and non-resistance. Perhaps Heisenberg should have stood up to Hitler in a definite way in the first place and then he would have not had to have written his “Active and Passive Resistance.”